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Accommodating Everyone
Nicole Buonocore Porter*
This Article attempts to eliminate “special treatment stigma” by accommodating
everyone. Special treatment stigma occurs when some employees (usually individuals
with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities) are provided with
accommodations in the workplace. This receipt of “special treatment” causes employers
and coworkers to resent these employees. This Article argues that the best way to
ameliorate the stigma that accompanies special treatment in the workplace is to
accommodate everyone through a universal accommodation mandate. This mandate
would require employers to accommodate all employees who request an accommodation
in the workplace, regardless of the reason for the accommodation. As long as the
accommodation requested was “reasonable” and did not cause an “undue hardship,”
employers would be required to provide it. However, recognizing that some reasons for
requesting accommodations are truly more compelling than other reasons, I propose the
implementation of a two-tier undue hardship analysis. Thus, for accommodations that
are necessary either to allow an employee to perform the essential functions of the job or
to allow an employee to attend to unavoidable caregiving obligations, the undue
hardship defense would be the more stringent test used under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, where “undue hardship” is defined as “significant difficulty or
expense.” For all other accommodation requests, the employer would still be required to
grant them as long as they do not cause an undue hardship using the more lenient
standard used for religious accommodations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, where undue hardship has been defined as anything more than a “de minimis
expense.” My hope is that this universal accommodation mandate—which allows all
employees to request an accommodation but recognizes at least some hierarchy between
necessary accommodations and all other accommodations—will eliminate the harm
caused by special treatment stigma while still creating a workable standard.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In prior work, I argued that there is a common bond between
employees with disabilities and workers with caregiving
responsibilities.1 That common bond is based on these employees’
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like to thank
participants at the Accommodations Discussion Group at the Southeastern Association
of Law Schools Annual Conference in August 2015 and the participants at the AALS
2015 Mid-Year Meeting on Next Generation Issues on Sex & Gender, where I
presented earlier versions of this paper. More specifically, at the risk of being under-
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failure to meet their employers’ workplace expectations, or failure to
comply with the “ideal worker”2 norm.3 This failure often causes these
employees to request job modifications, which are often stigmatized as
special treatment—I call this “special-treatment stigma.”4
The
perception of special treatment causes these employees to be
stigmatized by their employers and by their coworkers.5 Employers
often believe accommodating workers is expensive and burdensome,6
so they might refuse to provide accommodations if those
accommodations are not required by law. Alternatively, employers
might choose to not hire or promote employees who need
accommodations.7 The stigma from coworkers is less overt; coworkers
often resent accommodations given to employees either because those
accommodations cause burdens on the coworkers or the
accommodation is something that the coworkers covet.8 This coworker
resentment in turn makes employers uncomfortable, and gives them
another reason to refuse to provide accommodations or to avoid
employing individuals who need accommodations.
Because both groups of employees—individuals with disabilities
and workers with caregiving responsibilities—share this common
experience, I argued in prior work that caregiving should be
accommodated in the same way as disability is accommodated9 under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).10 I relied on the
inclusive, I would like to thank Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Vicki Schultz, Gowri
Ramachandran, Jessica Clarke, Deborah Widiss, Nancy Leong, Bradley Areheart,
Michael Waterstone, Kerri Stone, Jessica Roberts, Elizabeth Pendo, and Ani Satz. I
would also like to thank the faculty at the University of Toledo College of Law for their
helpful comments during a workshop, and the University of Toledo College of Law for
its summer research support. Finally, special thanks to Bryan Lammon, both
professionally (for giving me the title of this paper and very helpful edits) and
personally (for everything else).
1
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1103–15 (2014).
2
This phrase was first coined by Joan Williams and is now used by many in
work/family scholarship. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1 (1999).
3
Porter, supra note 1, at 1104–08.
4
I coined this phrase to refer to the stigma individuals suffer from when receiving
special treatment in the workplace. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care About
Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify Protection of “Real” Workers, 58 U. KAN.
L. REV. 355, 359 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Why Care].
5
Porter, supra note 1, at 1108.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 1111–12.
9
Id. at 1138–52.
10
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2008).
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communitarian theory to demonstrate that accommodating both
workers with caregiving responsibilities and individuals with disabilities
benefits the workplace community, which includes employers,
employees, and society.11 At that time, I specifically explored and
A universal
rejected a universal accommodation mandate.12
accommodation mandate would allow employees to request
accommodations for any variation of the job functions, the workplace
environment, or the structural norms13 of the workplace, regardless of
Although I recognized that
the reason for the request.14
accommodating everyone through a universal mandate would be the
only way to truly end the stigma that accompanies special treatment,15
I could not envision a workable universal accommodation mandate. I
imagined all kinds of difficult line-drawing decisions employers would
have to make when figuring out whether a specific accommodation is
necessary, even though the specific reason for the accommodation
could not be challenged.16 Thus, I ultimately rejected a universal
accommodation mandate, and as discussed above, I focused on
arguing in favor of accommodating caregivers in the same way that we
currently accommodate individuals with disabilities.17
But for reasons I discuss below, and after much thoughtful
deliberation, I have reversed my way of thinking on both issues. I no
longer think an accommodation mandate for only caregivers and
individuals with disabilities is workable, for several reasons. First, the
accommodation most often requested by both caregivers and
individuals with disabilities is a modification to the structural norms of
the workplace,18 but (as I have explored in other works) these
structural norms are very entrenched in most workplaces, and most
employers are reluctant to modify them.19 Second, I have reluctantly
arrived at the realization that we will never eliminate special-treatment
11

Porter, supra note 1, at 1138–51.
Id. at 1133–38.
13
The “structural norms” of the workplace refer to hours, shifts, schedules,
attendance policies, overtime requirements, and leave of absence policies—the when
and where work is performed. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82
TENN. L. REV. 1, 70–71 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, Backlash].
14
Porter, supra note 1, at 1135.
15
Id. at 1133–35.
16
Id. at 1136.
17
Id. at 1138–52.
18
See, e.g., Lisa Schur et al., Accommodating Employees with and Without Disabilities, 53
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. 593, 601 (2014).
19
Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 73–78; Nicole Buonocore Porter, Caregiver
Conundrum Redux: The Entrenchment of Structural Norms, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 963, 981–
86 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, Entrenchment].
12
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stigma as long as we continue to give what appears to be preferential
treatment to certain groups of employees.
Moreover, I now believe that I can conceptualize a workable
universal accommodation mandate. This Article is devoted to that
effort. Specifically, I propose and justify accommodating everyone20
through a universal accommodation mandate that avoids some of the
earlier problems I had identified by utilizing a two-tier “undue
hardship” test.
As many readers know, the undue hardship analysis appears in
two places in the employment discrimination context. Under the
ADA, employers have to provide reasonable accommodations to
employees with disabilities as long as they do not cause an undue
hardship on the employer.21 Undue hardship is defined as “significant
difficulty or expense.”22 The other place we see the concept of undue
hardship is in the religious discrimination context under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. There, under section 701(j) of the statute,
Congress defined religion to include “all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”23 Even though
undue hardship is not defined in the statute with respect to religious
accommodations, the Supreme Court defined it to mean anything
more than a “de minimis cost.”24
I use these two different undue hardship standards to propose a
universal accommodation mandate with a two-tier undue hardship
analysis. Thus, if an accommodation is necessary either because the
employee cannot perform the essential functions of the job without it
or because the employee would be neglecting an unavoidable
caregiving obligation without it, the accommodation would have to be
granted so long as it does not cause an undue hardship under the more

20

Some readers might be familiar with the recent article published by well-known
disability scholars: Accommodating Every Body. Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating
Every Body, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (2014). As I explain below, my proposal is different
from theirs because their proposal calls for accommodating all individuals who need
an accommodation to be able to physically perform the functions of their job. Id. at
693. My proposal involves accommodating not just every “body,” but literally
“everyone.”
21
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009).
22
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).
23
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1991).
24
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
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stringent test under the ADA—“significant difficulty or expense.”25 For
all other accommodation requests, the accommodation would have to
be granted unless the employer could demonstrate that the
accommodation would cause an undue hardship using the more
lenient test developed in the religious accommodation context, where
anything more than a de minimis expense is considered an undue
hardship. My goal with proposing this universal accommodation
mandate with the two-tier undue hardship test is two-fold: eliminating
the stigma that accompanies special treatment, and creating a
workable proposal that recognizes that some accommodations are
more necessary than others.
This Article proceeds in four additional parts. Part II elaborates
on the common bond experienced by individuals with disabilities and
workers with caregiving responsibilities, explaining how their failure
to conform to the ideal worker norm has led to the marginalization of
both groups because of the stigma that accompanies the need for
special treatment in the workplace. Part II also explains why I believe
my prior proposal to only accommodate these two groups of employees
is unworkable.
Part III sets forth my proposal for a universal accommodation
mandate that will hopefully work to end the stigma that accompanies
special treatment in the workplace. It discusses why I rejected the idea
of a universal accommodation mandate in prior work before turning
to the mechanics of how this universal accommodation mandate, with
its two-tier undue hardship analysis, would operate. This Part also
provides the justifications for this proposal. Part IV responds to the
anticipated criticism likely to be lobbed at this effort. Finally, Part V
briefly concludes.
II. THE COMMON BOND26
This Part will explore the common bond between individuals with
disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities. Although I
recognize the significant differences between these two groups of
employees,27 the common bond they share in the workplace is what
leads to the marginalization of both groups of employees.
25

42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).
This Part is derived in part from my earlier work. Porter, supra note 1, at 1103–
15; Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 43
PEPP. L. REV. 213 (2016) [hereinafter Porter, Stigma].
27
Porter, supra note 1, at 1119–31 (explaining the differences between the two
groups of employees, but ultimately arguing that the differences are not so significant
as to justify the different treatment in the law).
26
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A. Cannot Conform to the Ideal-Worker Norm
Both individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving
responsibilities have difficulty meeting their employers’ expectations.
Primarily, these two groups of employees have difficulty meeting the
“structural norms” of the workplace—the policies involving when and
where work is performed.28 Most jobs are built around an able-bodied
and masculine norm.29 This norm expects employees to be available
to work full-time and overtime, often at a moment’s notice.30 Many
jobs also have strict attendance policies and very rigid hours, schedules,
and shifts.31 Individuals with disabilities often need time off for
medical appointments or to address the physical manifestations of
their disabilities.32 They also might need a change in hours or reduced
hours in order to successfully work with their disability.33 Workers with
caregiving responsibilities often need time off to take children or adult
loved ones to medical or other appointments,34 and they often miss
work if children are sick and cannot attend school or daycare.35
Furthermore, workers with caregiving responsibilities might need or
want to work particular shifts or hours in order to more successfully
combine work with their children’s daycare or school schedules.36 In
addition to the difficulty these groups of employees have meeting the
structural norms of the workplace, some employees also have difficulty
performing the physical functions of the job. This Part will take each
of these problems in turn.
1. Structural Norms of the Workplace37
There are plenty of cases demonstrating the difficulty both groups
of employees have meeting their employers’ demands regarding the
structural norms of the workplace. For instance, in the caregiving
context, many workers faced termination because they had too many
absences due to pregnancy or caregiving responsibilities.38 In one case,
28

Id. at 1104.
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 362.
30
Porter, Entrenchment, supra note 19, at 966.
31
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 362.
32
In fact, as stated above, the most commonly requested accommodation by
employees with disabilities was a change to the employee’s work schedule. Schur et
al., supra note 18, at 601.
33
See id.
34
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 361.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 361–62.
37
This Part is derived in significant part from Porter, supra note 1, at 1104–07.
38
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to
29
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the plaintiff was terminated one day before a scheduled maternity
leave for being tardy due to severe morning sickness.39 She lost her
lawsuit.40
And as I’ve noted before, “Some of the most troubling [work/
family] conflict stories involve a caregiver having to make the
impossible decision between leaving a child alone or losing [her]
job.”41 For instance, one woman was terminated because her child was
in a car accident and had to be taken to the hospital.42 Another mother
left her one-year-old and nine-year-old children home alone because
the babysitter did not arrive on time and the mother’s employer had
threatened termination if she did not report to work; while she was
gone, the children died in a fire.43 There is no federal protection for
the woman in the latter story.44 It is possible that the woman in the first
story could have been eligible for leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), but that statute only covers employers with fifty or
more employees and only covers employees who have worked for the
employer for at least one year.45 And even when employees are eligible
for leave under the FMLA, simply requesting that leave can stigmatize
those employees.46 In fact, some argue that women who are of childbearing age experience stigma because their employers believe they
will request leave, even if they have yet to do so.47
Even when not subject to strict attendance policies, many
caregivers have difficulty meeting the overtime requirements or the

Solving the Caregiving Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777, 783–85,
847–48 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Synergistic Solutions].
39
Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994).
40
Id.
41
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 407–08.
42
9TO5, NAT’L ASS’N OF WORKING WOMEN, 10 Things That Could Happen to You If
You Didn’t Have Paid Sick Days and the Best Way to Make Sure they Never Happen to Anyone,
4
(2014),
http://njtimetocare.com/sites/default/files/18_Ten%20Things%20That%20Could
%20Happen%20to%20You%20if%20You%20Didnt%20Have%20Paid%20Sick%20D
ays.pdf.
43
Nina Bernstein, Daily Choice Turned Deadly: Children Left on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/nyregion/daily-choiceturned-deadly-children-left-on-their-own.html?pagewanted=all.
44
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New Perspective, A New
Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 327, 340–41 (2013) [hereinafter Porter, FMLA].
45
5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
46
Thus, this is the reason that the Family and Medical Leave Act was drafted to be
gender neutral. Porter, FMLA, supra note 44, at 333–34.
47
See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Embracing Caregiving and Respecting Choice: An Essay
on the Debate Over Changing Gender Norms, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 40 (2011).
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face-time requirements of their employers.48 For instance, in one case,
a divorced single mother was fired when she requested to work more
manageable hours than the almost fourteen-hour, six day-a-week
schedule that her employer demanded.49 Many professional women
seek—and suffer stigma from—working part time or reduced-hour
schedules.50
Individuals with disabilities also have difficulty complying with the
structural norms of the workplace. As stated above, in one study, the
most requested accommodation by individuals with disabilities was a
modification to their schedules.51 Although “part-time or modified
work schedules” is listed as a possible accommodation in the statute,52
employers often successfully argue that the accommodation does not
have to be granted because the schedule or shift is an “essential
function” of the job.53
For instance, in one case, the plaintiff managed an AT&T store,
and working more than forty hours per week exacerbated her MS
symptoms.54 She asked for an accommodation to limit her work
schedule to no more than forty hours per week but her employer
refused, stating that being able to work more than forty hours per week
was an essential function of the store manager position.55 Similarly, in
another case, the plaintiff was a systems engineer who worked between
sixty to eighty hours per week.56 After he was diagnosed with hepatitis
C, he requested an accommodation that would allow him to reduce his
hours to forty hours per week so he could get adequate rest and reduce
his stress level.57 Although the employer temporarily accommodated
him, it refused to accommodate him on an ongoing basis, arguing that
it could not continue to do so without hiring additional staff, thus
making the accommodation unreasonable.58 The court agreed with
the employer and held that working overtime was an essential function
48

Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 38, at 785–86.
Upton v. JWP Businessland, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (Mass. 1997).
50
Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 38, at 787–88.
51
Schur et al., supra note 18, at 601.
52
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2008).
53
See Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 62 (2005) (criticizing this practice by
employers and courts).
54
EEOC v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, No. 10-13889, 2011 WL 6309449, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2011).
55
Id. at *3–4.
56
Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 37 P.3d 333, 335 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d, 70 P.3d
126 (Wash. 2003).
57
Id.
58
Id.
49
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of the job and the employer was not obligated to accommodate the
plaintiff.59 Other scholars have commented on this phenomenon,
where employers refuse to provide accommodations for the structural
norms of the workplace.60
In a recent work, I explored many cases where the plaintiff
unsuccessfully sought an accommodation to one of the structural
norms of the workplace after the ADA Amendments Act (“ADAAA”).61
Many of these cases involved shifts and schedules. For instance, in
Tucker v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services, the plaintiff could not work the
night shift because of the effects of his migraine medicine, and he was
fired from his job.62 The court held that he was not qualified because
working all shifts was an essential function of the job.63
Similarly, in Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, a registered nurse
sought light duty, no nights, no weekends, and five-hour workdays after
she suffered a stroke.64 The court held that the plaintiff was not a
qualified individual, deferring to the employer’s argument that all
nurses must rotate being on call at night and on the weekends to
provide health care in emergency situations.65
In another case involving rotating shifts, the plaintiff requested a
permanent eight-hour day shift schedule following a surgery.66 The
plaintiff was employed as a resource coordinator and that position was
scheduled to work rotating shifts in order to provide twenty-four-hour
customer service.67 The employer denied plaintiff’s request for a
permanent day shift, arguing that working rotating shifts was an

59

Id. at 337.
See generally CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE
MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY & MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE 67 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2010) (stating that despite specific language in the ADA allowing for
accommodations regarding schedules, courts often reject as unreasonable any
accommodations that might modify “institutionalized time standards” without looking
at whether they can be accomplished easily); Travis, supra note 53, at 24–36 (discussing
cases where courts held that full-time schedules, excessive hours, mandatory overtime,
being present at work (rather than working from home), set starting and ending times,
and regular attendance are all essential functions of the job).
61
Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 73–78. This discussion is derived in significant
part from this work.
62
Tucker v. Mo. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., No. 2:11-CV-04134-NKL, 2012 WL 6115604,
at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 2012).
63
Id. at *4, *6.
64
Azzam v. Baptist Healthcare Affiliates, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 653, 655–56 (W.D.
Ky. 2012).
65
Id. at 661–62.
66
Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp., 691 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2012).
67
Id. at 927.
60
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essential function of the job. The court agreed.68
One recent case dealt with the hours an employee works. In White
v. Standard Insurance Co., the court held that full-time employment was
an essential function of the job, and therefore the plaintiff, whose back
pain limited her ability to work more than four hours per day, was not
qualified.69
Several recent cases held that attendance is an essential function
of the job. One case stated that a business does not have to endure
“erratic, unreliable attendance by its employees,” even when that
conduct is due to an alleged disability, specifically depression, anxiety,
and migraine headaches.70 Similarly, in Lewis v. New York City Police
Department, the court found that the plaintiff’s absences because of her
disability established that she was not a qualified individual.71
Certainly, it makes sense for an employer to expect reliable
attendance of its employees, including those employees who have a
disability. However, when an employee with a disability misses too
much work, she often needs either to be able to work from home for a
period of time, or she simply needs time to heal to get her medical
issues resolved or under control. Thus, the reliable attendance issue
often coincides with working from home and leaves of absence as
possible accommodations.72
Although some employers allow both of these accommodations,73
many more refuse them.74 In one particularly troubling case, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was not
qualified when she violated the employer’s very stringent attendance
policy (allowing only eight absences per year) while she was
experiencing numbness and weakness related to an eventual diagnosis
of multiple sclerosis.75 Because she had not been employed for more
than one year, she was not entitled to FMLA leave.76 The employer
refused to give her leave even though it had a discretionary policy that
allowed thirty days of leave in some circumstances.77 Because the court
found that there was not any evidence that thirty days would be enough
68

Id. at 931.
White v. Standard Ins. Co., 529 F. App’x 547, 549–50 (6th Cir. 2013).
70
Brown v. Honda of Am., No. 2:10-CV-459, 2012 WL 4061795, at *4–6 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 14, 2012).
71
Lewis v. New York City Police Dep’t, 908 F. Supp. 2d 313, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
72
Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 76.
73
Id. at 73.
74
Id. at 76–77.
75
Basden v. Prof’l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1036–37 (7th Cir. 2013).
76
Id. at 1039.
77
Id. at 1037.
69
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time for plaintiff to recover enough to return to work, the court
affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment.78
2. Physical Functions of the Job
Obviously, some employees with disabilities have difficulty
performing the physical functions of the job and therefore must seek
accommodations. As I have concluded in a study of recent cases
brought under the ADA after it was amended in 2008, employers are
more likely to grant accommodation requests when those requests seek
a modification of the physical functions of the job (rather than a
modification of the structural norms of the workplace),79 but there are
still many cases where employers refuse to grant accommodations,
often arguing that the physical task is an essential function of the job,80
and therefore, there is no way of accommodating it without
eliminating the function, which is not required under the ADA.81
Although most workers with caregiving responsibilities do not
have difficulty performing the physical tasks of the job, many pregnant
workers do, and pregnancy is a form of caregiving. Some pregnant
women have complications with their pregnancies that cause their
doctors to put restrictions on what they can do—usually involving
lifting or other physically arduous functions of the job.82
Thus, because both individuals with disabilities and workers with
caregiving responsibilities have difficulty consistently meeting their
employers’ expectations, they are forced to seek some type of
accommodations or modifications of the job. As I have argued
elsewhere, doing so causes them to be subject to special treatment
stigma.
B. Special Treatment Stigma
When employees seek accommodations in the workplace, they are
often subject to special treatment stigma. They are stigmatized by both
their employers and their coworkers.
78

Id.
Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 67–70.
80
Id. at 65–66.
81
Porter, supra note 1, at 1108; Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 70.
82
See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015) (noting
that the plaintiff’s doctor restricted her from lifting over 20 pounds for the first 20
weeks of her pregnancy and over 10 pounds thereafter); Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of
Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the plaintiff’s doctor put her
on light duty from her job as a police officer after she was in an altercation with a
suspect).
79
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First, employers are often reluctant to accommodate workers if
they do not believe that the law absolutely requires them to. And when
the law does require the employer to accommodate an employee,
employers are sometimes more reluctant to hire or promote those
individuals who need or are likely to need accommodations. Second,
employees who receive accommodations are stigmatized by their
coworkers because their coworkers are resentful of the
accommodations—either because those accommodations place
burdens on the coworkers or because they are accommodations that
the coworkers also covet. I will elaborate on each of these in turn.
1. Stigmatized by Employers83
As I have explored elsewhere, despite having a legal obligation to
accommodate individuals with disabilities (as compared to workers
with caregiving responsibilities), employers often are reluctant to
provide accommodations to individuals with disabilities.84 In fact,
employers are often willing to provide informal accommodations to an
employee until and unless the employee requests an accommodation
that signals a possible legal obligation.85 For instance, in Serednyj v.
Beverly Healthcare, LLC,86 in her attempt to prove that the employer
discriminated against her because of her pregnancy, the plaintiff
pointed to the fact that before her pregnancy, other employees assisted
her in performing her more strenuous job duties, but after she became
pregnant and asked for the same assistance, the employer refused.87
The court stated that there was a material difference between
requesting and receiving assistance from other employees and forcing
those employees to give assistance if needed as an accommodation.88
In the disability law context, I have described a similar phenomenon
that I call “withdrawn accommodations.”89 Frequently, employers are
willing to provide temporary modifications of job duties, but when the
employee requests a permanent accommodation, the employer refuses

83

This sub-part is derived in significant part from a prior work. See Porter, supra
note 1, at 1109–11.
84
Porter, supra note 1, at 1109.
85
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 56 (2009) (“Disability rights advocates commonly charge that employers
accommodate the needs of workers without disabilities all the time; in many cases, it is
only when a disabled worker asks for accommodation that the employer balks.”).
86
Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011).
87
Id. at 549.
88
Id.
89
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Withdrawn Accommodations, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 885
(2015).
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and withdraws the accommodation.90
Further evidence that employers dislike having to provide
accommodations is the fact that the ADA has not noticeably improved
the employment rate of individuals with disabilities.91 Many scholars
have argued that the reason for this is because employers are resistant
to providing accommodations to individuals with disabilities92 so
employers simply do not hire those individuals.93 As most employment
lawyers know, it is far easier for an employer to defend a failure to hire
claim than it is to defend a termination claim.94 Therefore, anything
that arguably increases the costs of employing an individual or makes
it more difficult for an employer to fire an employee might incentivize
an employer to not hire the individual in the first place.95
2. Stigmatized by Coworkers96
Coworkers resent employees who receive accommodations for
two reasons. First, they resent some accommodations that place
burdens on the coworkers. Second, coworkers resent accommodations
that they wish they could have.
Courts often reject accommodations if those accommodations
require assistance from other employees. For instance, in Meinen v.
Godfrey Brake Service & Supply, Inc.,97 after the plaintiff was hospitalized
and subsequently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS),98 the
company created two part-time positions to cover the parts department
90

Id. at 896–905.
BAGENSTOS, supra note 85, at 117 (stating that the ADA “has failed significantly
to improve the employment position of people with disabilities”).
92
Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA
Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1308 (2009) (“It has . . . been suggested that
the ADA has increased the difficulty for individuals with disabilities to obtain
employment, because employers seek to avoid the obligations under the statute.”);
Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities
Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 315 (noting that
“employers were initially the ADA’s primary opponents because of the concerns about
the potential costs of accommodations”).
93
BAGENSTOS, supra note 85, at 117 (pointing to, but disagreeing with, some
commentators who argue that the employment rates of individuals with disabilities
declined because of the ADA).
94
Id. at 134.
95
Porter, supra note 1, at 1111.
96
This Part is derived from Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 236–39, and Porter,
supra note 1, at 1111–15. Because employers have a legal obligation to accommodate
employees with disabilities, most of these cases demonstrating the resentment of
coworkers are cases brought under the ADA.
97
Meinen v. Godfrey Brake Serv. & Supply, Inc., No. CIV. 10-5077-JLV, 2012 WL
4364669 (D.S.D. Sept. 24, 2012).
98
Id. at *1.
91
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(where plaintiff had worked) and to retain his position until he could
return to work.99 When the plaintiff returned to work, he could not
work more than four hours per day.100 The plaintiff’s supervisor
testified that upon the plaintiff’s return, when he was still suffering
from some vision loss caused by the MS, the plaintiff required a lot of
help from other employees in seeing parts to determine what they
were, finding parts in the catalog, and locating parts in the building.101
The supervisor testified that “it bothered him that other employees
had to help [the plaintiff] because it was taking time away from other
things that needed to be done.”102 When the defendant terminated the
plaintiff, the supervisor stated that a full-time employee would be
preferable because the plaintiff required so much help that took away
from other employees’ time.103 When the plaintiff’s wife went into the
workplace to collect plaintiff’s check, she asked the owner whether
there was anything that her husband could do to keep his job.104 He
replied in the negative, stating that the plaintiff “was too slow and that
he couldn’t have his other employees wasting their time helping” the
plaintiff.105 The court held that creation of a part-time position is not
a reasonable accommodation and that simply allowing the plaintiff to
work a part-time position for a period of time does not obligate the
employer to continue to provide the accommodation.106 More
importantly for our purposes here, the court also held that the
employer was not required to continue to provide the plaintiff with
assistance from other employees in performing the essential
functions.107
In a similar case, Lopez v. Tyler Refrigeration Corp.,108 the plaintiff
suffered an injury at work that led to permanent restrictions, including
an inability to lift objects over twenty-five pounds and only occasional

99

Id. at *2.
Id. at *1 n.3.
101
Id. at *3.
102
Id.
103
Meinen, 2012 WL4364669, at *3.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at *10. I find it interesting (and somewhat infuriating) that even though the
ADA lists “part-time or modified work schedules” as possible reasonable
accommodations, courts easily ignore this by stating that the accommodation
requested is not a modification to the current position, but rather is the creation of an
entirely new part-time position. Id. at *8–9.
107
Id. at *13.
108
Lopez v. Tyler Refrigerator Corp., No. 99-10637, 2000 WL 122387 (5th Cir. Jan.
4, 2000) (per curiam).
100
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use of hand tools for no more than two hours daily.109 After allowing
the plaintiff to work around his restrictions for a short period of time,
the employer fired him because his restrictions would never allow him
to return to his regular assembler position.110 The plaintiff’s supervisor
testified that when he created a temporary modified job for the
plaintiff, the more strenuous aspects of the job were given to other
employees so that the plaintiff could work on the easier functions.111
In holding that the plaintiff was not qualified to perform the essential
functions of the position, the court stated that it was “unreasonable” to
modify the job permanently to meet the plaintiff’s restrictions because
it forced other employees to perform the heavy lifting of the job.112
Some cases more explicitly demonstrate coworkers’ resistance to
accommodations that arguably make other employees work harder or
longer.113 For instance, in Petrosky v. New York State Department of Motor
Vehicles,114 the plaintiff suffered stigma and resentment when she was
diagnosed with Type II diabetes and was required to take regular
breaks to eat and manage her condition properly.115 Although she
requested a lighter workload, she was given a heavier load after her
diabetes diagnosis, which sometimes caused her to be unable to take
the breaks she needed to properly manage her diabetes.116 The facts
indicate that she was the “subject of derogatory comments and
complaints from co-workers who contended that they were required to
do more work” because of her illness.117 In addition, when she
requested reduced hours, two of her supervisors complained about her
request.118
Although the plaintiff ultimately survived summary
judgment, this case demonstrates the type of bias employees face when
they ask for accommodations in the workplace.119
109

Id. at *1.
Id.
111
Id. at *2.
112
Id. at *3.
113
See, e.g., Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 357 (8th Cir. 2007) (indicating it is
unreasonable to accommodate a disabled employee if doing so would require other
employees to work harder or longer); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124–25
(10th Cir. 1995) (“An accommodation that would result in other employees having to
work[] harder or longer hours is not required.”).
114
Petrovsky v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 72 F. Supp. 2d 39 (N.D.N.Y.
1999).
115
Id. at 46.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 60 (“The record reflects that Petrosky’s supervisors and coworkers were
upset by realignments made in the work schedule to accommodate Petrosky.”).
110
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Modifications to the structural norms of the workplace for an
individual with a disability can also place burdens on coworkers. For
instance, a commonly requested accommodation is a waiver of the
requirement to work rotating shifts. Many employers who operate
around the clock utilize rotating shifts, but if an individual has a
disability that precludes him from working rotating shifts, the easiest
way for an employer to accommodate this request is to require other
employees to rotate through the less desirable shifts more often.120 The
courts are almost uniform in holding that an employer does not have
to allow an employee with a disability to have a waiver of the rotating
shifts requirement as an accommodation.121 And in so holding, the
courts use rhetoric indicating that they are concerned about placing
burdens on the coworkers of the individual with a disability.
For instance, in Bogner v. Wackenhut Corp.,122 the plaintiff, who had
epilepsy and suffered from occasional seizures, asked to work only the
day shift because his doctor believed that it would limit the recurrence
of his seizures.123 In holding that rotating shifts were an essential
function of the job, and therefore, it was unreasonable to allow the
plaintiff to avoid working rotating shifts as an accommodation, the
court stated that the accommodation was not reasonable because it
would impose “an additional burden on Bogner’s co-workers.”124
In another case, the plaintiff had Type I diabetes and related
complications.125 The plaintiff worked as a resource coordinator, and
her employer required all resource coordinators to work rotating
shifts, rotating between twelve-hour and eight-hour shifts and between
day and night shifts.126 Because of the difficulties associated with
managing her diabetes, the plaintiff’s doctor advised her to work a

120

Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 245–47. But see id. at 244–45 (discussing a real
life scenario I dealt with in practice where the employer allowed itself to overstaff on
the day shift (which the disabled employee needed) and understaff on the afternoon
or night shifts to avoid placing the burden on other employees of rotating through the
less desirable shifts more often).
121
Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 245–47 (discussing cases). However, I have
found one case where the court held that the employer should have granted the
plaintiff’s request to only work the day shift and not the graveyard shift, because the
graveyard shift exacerbated plaintiff’s insomnia, migraine headaches, and depression.
Maes v. City of Espanola, No. 1:12-CV-01250, 2014 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36154
(D.N.M. Jan. 13, 2014).
122
Bogner v. Wackenhut Corp., No. 05-CV-6171, 2008 WL 84590 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2008).
123
Id. at *1–2.
124
Id. at *6.
125
Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corp. Servs., 691 F.3d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 2012).
126
Id. at 927.
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straight day shift.127 Apparently, the rotating shift was causing her to
experience erratic changes in her blood pressure and blood sugar and
was putting her at higher risk of diabetic complications, including
death.128 The plaintiff appealed from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, arguing that the court
erred in finding that working rotating shifts was an essential function
of the position.129 The court stated that shift rotation enhances the
non-work life of the other employees by spreading the less desirable
shifts among all of the employees. If the plaintiff were allowed to work
a straight day shift, other employees would have to work more night
and weekend shifts.130 In fact, the employer had considered adding a
couple of straight-shift positions, but it abandoned the idea because
other employees complained.131
Similarly, in Dicksey v. New Hanover Sheriff’s Department, the
plaintiff, who had a seizure disorder, was transferred to a job working
rotating shifts.132 His doctor advised that he would be better able to
control his seizure disorder if he worked a straight shift.133 The day
after he requested a straight shift as an accommodation for his
disability, he was terminated.134 In holding that the employer should
not have to reallocate essential functions of the job (working a rotating
shift), the court used the often-stated rule that any accommodation
that makes other employees work harder or longer is unreasonable.135
The court also stated: “Assigning plaintiff to the day shift on an
indefinite basis would have placed upon plaintiff’s coworkers or his
boss the burden of working plaintiff’s night shifts.”136
Finally, in Rehrs v. Iams Co., the plaintiff, who suffered from Type
I diabetes, began having trouble managing his diabetes when his
company implemented a rotating-shift schedule for all warehouse
workers.137 His doctor requested that he be placed on a fixed daytime
schedule in order to better control his diabetes, and although he was
allowed to work that schedule for a period of time, the employer
127

Id. at 928.
Id.
129
Id. at 930.
130
Id. at 931.
131
Kallail, 691 F.3d at 931.
132
Dicksey v. New Hanover Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 522 F. Supp. 2d 742, 744–45
(E.D.N.C. 2007).
133
Id. at 745.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 748–49.
136
Id. at 749.
137
Rehrs v. Iams Co., 486 F.3d 353, 354–55 (8th Cir. 2007).
128
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eventually withdrew this accommodation and put him on short-term
disability leave.138 When defending the lawsuit, the employer argued
that not enforcing the shift rotation would “adversely affect other
technicians, creating inequities, because these other technicians would
be forced to work the night shift exclusively or for longer periods and
lose the benefits of shift rotation, thereby decreasing their
opportunities for promotion and development.”139
In addition to rotating shifts, courts sometimes find that leaves of
absence and working from home accommodations place burdens on
other employees. For instance, in Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc.,
the court held that the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation to
allow her to work at home was unreasonable.140 The plaintiff worked
as a service coordinator, which required her to schedule service
appointments for technicians working in the field.141 After a horrific
workplace violence scare, the plaintiff learned that the threatening
employee was going to return to work, and she became sick, suffering
from post-traumatic stress disorder.142 Accordingly, she asked for
several accommodations, including relocating the threatening
employee, allowing her to work at another facility, and allowing her to
work from home.143 The employer denied these requests.144 In
determining whether working from home was a reasonable
accommodation, the court deferred to the employer’s assertion that
teamwork was an essential function of the coordinator position
because the coordinators assisted and covered for one another.145 The
court stated that the plaintiff’s “suggestion that teamwork is not an
essential function because other service coordinators can pick up the
slack in her stead is simply irrelevant in determining whether
teamwork is an essential function of the job.”146
In a similar case, the plaintiff needed to miss work intermittently
because she had several disabilities.147
Her supervisor began
questioning her about her frequent absences and told her that every

138

Id. at 355.
Id. at 357.
140
Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1116 (10th Cir. 2004).
141
Id. at 1117.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 1117–18.
145
Id. at 1121.
146
Mason, 357 F.3d at 1121.
147
Zimmerman v. Gruma Corp., No. 3:11-CV-01990-L, 2013 WL 3154118, at *1–2
(N.D. Tex. June 21, 2013).
139
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time she was not at work, she placed a burden on her coworkers.148 The
plaintiff claimed that she received “ongoing harassment” because of
her absences.149
The cases above addressed the situation where a coworker resents
an accommodation because the accommodation places burdens on
other employees. The second reason coworkers might be resentful of
an accommodation is if they see the accommodation as providing
preferential treatment to the individual with a disability. In other
words, coworkers are resentful when some employees receive
accommodations that the coworkers covet.150 This resentment also
leads some employers to not want to grant the accommodation, for
fear of the backlash they might receive from granting what looks like
“special treatment” or because they are worried about the precedentsetting effect of granting some accommodations.151
For instance, in Hancock v. Washington Hospital Center, the court
considered whether an employer should have to give the plaintiff an
accommodation that could be seen as preferential treatment.152 The
plaintiff was a medical assistant whose responsibilities included, among
other things, quite a bit of walking and lifting.153 After complications
related to a surgery to remove cysts, the plaintiff was under doctor’s
instructions that limited her ability to lift and walk.154 One of the
possible accommodations discussed was to allow her a light duty
position of answering the telephones.155 The plaintiff’s supervisor
balked at this request stating: “If I only utilize her on the phones (longterm), then it sets me up to have to make likewise accommodations for
other staff members in the future.”156
Similarly, in Lee v. Harrah’s New Orleans, the plaintiff was a dealer
in a casino and suffered from severe back pain and fibromyalgia, which
limited her ability to stand for long periods of time.157 Plaintiff’s
position required her to stand most of the time, but another position,
the box person assignment, was mostly a sitting position. The plaintiff
148

Id. at *2.
Id.
150
Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 249–51.
151
Id. at 249.
152
Hancock v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 908 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d,
618 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
153
Id. at 20.
154
Id. at 20–21.
155
Id. at 22.
156
Id.
157
Lee v. Harrah’s New Orleans, No. 11-570, 2013 WL 3899895, at *1 (E.D. La. July
29, 2013).
149
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requested to be assigned to the box person position as an
accommodation for her disability.158 She sued when the employer
refused to assign her permanently to that position. Her supervisor
testified that he tried to assign her to the seated position as much as
possible without showing favoritism.159
Finally, the accommodation that might cause the most
resentment by other employees involves reassignment to another
position. If the employee can no longer perform the essential
functions of his current position, the employee might request
“reassignment to a vacant position,” which is an accommodation
specifically referenced in the ADA.160 As I have discussed elsewhere,
there is a circuit split in the courts regarding whether an employer has
to reassign an employee with a disability if another, more qualified
employee also applies for the vacant position.161 It is not difficult to
imagine how other employees might be resentful of an employee with
a disability if that employee gets a coveted position over the morequalified, non-disabled coworker.
Because employers are legally obligated to accommodate
individuals with disabilities, we see much more evidence of the
resentment of coworkers when accommodations are given to
individuals with disabilities. With the exception of providing leave
under the FMLA to eligible employees, employers are not legally
obligated to accommodate workers with caregiving responsibilities.162
Nevertheless, sometimes employers do accommodate caregivers. And
when they do, those caregivers experience the same type of resentment
that individuals with disabilities do.163 As I have discussed elsewhere,
other scholars have argued that accommodating caregivers is likely to
create tensions between those caregivers and their coworkers:164
158

Id. at *2, *4–5.
Id. at *2.
160
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2008).
161
Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 250–51 (comparing EEOC v. United Airlines,
Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012) with Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d
480 (8th Cir. 2007)).
162
Porter, supra note 1, at 1117–18. In some cases, however, employers might be
legally obligated to accommodate pregnant workers. See Young v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
163
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS
MATTER 35 (2010) (stating that when employers provide paid leave, they often burden
other employees, causing resentment).
164
Porter, supra note 1, at 1114; see also Michelle Travis, Equality in the Virtual
Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 329 (2003) (stating that when employers
change the rule for some but not all employees, this may “contribute to coworkers’
resentment and the feeling that accommodations represent bare preferential
treatment or affirmative action rather than a form of equal opportunity.”).
159
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The argument is that accommodating caregivers bestows
undue privileges on parents, yet holds nonparents to higher
performance standards. Many studies indicate that employees
without primary caregiving responsibilities express a desire to
work fewer hours like their caregiving counterparts and
express resentment that only the caregiving employees are
allowed the opportunity to work reduced hours. Many of us
have also heard anecdotal stories regarding coworkers’
resentment when workers with caregiving responsibilities must
leave work early or are not expected to come in on the
weekends, leaving the non-caregivers to pick up the slack for
their caregiving coworkers.165
This resentment was recently discussed by Professor Trina
Jones.166 She argues that the extension of flexibility and benefits to
some workers, when all workers experience difficulty balancing work
and life, has created a “tipping point,” causing single workers to
question the fairness of the load they are carrying.167 Specifically, she
argues that when companies try to appear family friendly, they
pressure single workers to travel more, work more weekends and
holidays, stay later during the week, and refrain from taking time off.168
Moreover, these companies often do not compensate for or treat single
workers better because of this extra work.169 She also argues that
parents get benefits that non-parents do not get but wish they could.170
Thus, Jones argues that this causes childfree workers to feel resentful
of the benefits given to working parents.171
C. My Prior Attempt to Ameliorate Special Treatment Stigma
Because individuals with disabilities and employees with
caregiving responsibilities are likely to suffer stigma flowing from both
employers and employees, I have spent quite some time trying to figure
out how to ameliorate the effects of “special treatment stigma.” In
prior work, I acknowledged that special treatment stigma was
inevitable and unavoidable unless we could change the minds of those
165

Porter, supra note 1, at 114 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Trina Jones, Single and Childfree! Reassessing Parental and Marital Status
Discrimination, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1253 (2014).
167
Id. at 1265.
168
Id. at 1266.
169
Id. at 1269–71.
170
Id. at 1329. Jones is referring to benefits such as tuition assistance for an
employee’s children, part-time or other reduced hour schedules, and flexible leave
policies.
171
Id. at 1255–56.
166
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who resented the accommodations given to individuals with disabilities
and sometimes to caregivers.172 In order to effect that culture shift, I
relied on communitarian theory.173
Specifically, I argued that if we focus on the workplace as a
community, and if we understand the advantages of working together
within the workplace community for the mutual benefit of all
employees (and the employer), we will have a better appreciation for
why accommodating both individuals with disabilities and caregivers is
appropriate and warranted.174 After explaining the basic tenets of
communitarian theory,175 I argued that this theory supported providing
accommodations to individuals with disabilities and caregivers.176 I
argued that the resentment coworkers feel towards individuals who
receive some type of special benefits in the workplace is evidence of an
overemphasis on individual rights.177 “Instead, if we all view the
workplace as a community and understood ourselves as having a
responsibility to others in our community,” the resentment coworkers
feel about accommodations would dissipate.178
Furthermore, I argued that the workplace community benefits in
several ways from providing individuals with accommodations.179 First,
accommodating workers allows them to remain employed, thereby
reducing the considerable costs of attrition and turnover.180 Second,
society benefits when employers provide accommodations to
individuals with disabilities and caregivers because increasing the
employment opportunities for these groups reduces the chance that
they will rely on public assistance.181 Third, relying in large part on the
important work of Professor Travis, I argued that the ADA benefits
nondisabled employees in addition to helping disabled employees.182
Finally, I argued that accommodating caregivers also benefits noncaregivers.183 I pointed out that caregiving is inevitable. All of us, at

172

Porter, supra note 1, at 1139–40.
Id. at 1139–52.
174
Id. at 1140.
175
These tenets include the departure from a preoccupation with rights and an
emphasis on the responsibility we owe to others within our communities. Porter, Why
Care, supra note 4, at 394.
176
Porter, supra note 1, at 1142.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id. at 1142–43.
180
Id. at 1142.
181
Id. at 1143.
182
Porter, supra note 1, at 1143–47.
183
Id. at 1148–51.
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one point or another, will either find ourselves in a caregiving role or
will be in need of care.184 This is true even for those who do not ever
have children.185 I also argued that parents and other caregivers have
a moral obligation to attend to the proper care of their children or
others who are dependent on them, and that society as a whole
(including non-caregivers) benefits when caregivers are given the tools
needed to provide this care.186 Thus, I argued, the communitarian
theory supports providing accommodations to caregivers in the same
way we accommodate individuals with disabilities.187
I still believe this to be true. I continue to believe that if employees
and employers would stop considering only their own interests and
would begin to see the benefits of working together in our workplace
communities, we could begin to eliminate the special treatment stigma
that accompanies accommodations in the workplace. But I recognize
this is quite a utopian position for me to take. With all of the emphasis
on individual merit, seniority, and competition in the workplace, in
addition to the sense of insecurity felt by many American workers, my
proposal to see the workplace as a community, where employees
support one another for the good of the community, will likely not
gain much traction. I accordingly suggest a compromise—a pragmatic
alternative to my more lofty goal of ending special treatment by
attacking it directly. I propose a universal accommodation mandate so
that there will no longer be any “special treatment” that can be
stigmatized.
III. ELIMINATING SPECIAL TREATMENT STIGMA BY ACCOMMODATING
EVERYONE
In order to eliminate the special treatment stigma suffered by
individuals with disabilities and workers with caregiving
responsibilities, this Part will propose and justify a universal
accommodation mandate. The idea of a universal accommodation
mandate is simple: any employee has the right to request a workplace
accommodation and the employer cannot refuse the request based on
the reason for the request. The employer would, of course, be able to
184

Id. at 1148.
Id. (pointing out that everyone could be forced into a caregiving role by being
called upon to provide care for a sick or disabled spouse, partner, parent, or other
family member).
186
Id. at 1149–50. But see Jones, supra note 166, at 1300 (arguing that, “while
parenting is important, the critical nature of this function alone is insufficient to
explain why [child free employees], who are doing the same work as parents within
the workplace, are required to indirectly subsidize parenting.”).
187
Id. at 1150.
185
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reject the request if the accommodation was unreasonable or if it
would cause an undue hardship. Otherwise, the employer must
provide the accommodation.
A. My Prior Consideration of a Universal Accommodation Mandate
In prior work, I considered, but ultimately rejected, the idea of a
universal accommodation mandate.188 My main concern was over the
difficulty in implementing such a broad mandate; specifically, I
became fixated on the idea that the employee requesting an
accommodation would have to prove that he needs the
accommodation.189 I found delineating the boundaries of “needs” to
be difficult. Is “need” based on the employee’s subjective perception
or an objective inquiry?190 For instance, imagine an employee is
training for a marathon in the winter and wants flex-time throughout
the winter (arriving earlier in the morning and leaving earlier in the
afternoon) in order to get home for training runs while it is still light
outside.
Does this marathon-training employee need the
accommodation?191 Or as another example, imagine an employee asks
to be excused from some of the cleaning tasks required of the job at
the end of the day because the cleaning materials irritate her, but not
to the point where her sensitivity would qualify as a disability under the
ADA. Does this employee need this accommodation?192 In both cases,
the individual employee might respond in the affirmative—she does
need the accommodation. And yet, the employers in both of these
situations are likely to disagree.
B. The New Universal Accommodation Mandate
This proposal picks up where the last proposal ended (and
188

Porter, supra note 1, at 1133–38.
The fixation on determining if someone needs an accommodation makes some
sense. It makes sense because, generally, when individuals with disabilities request
accommodations, it is because they cannot perform the essential functions of the job
without an accommodation. The ADA, however, also requires employers to provide
accommodations to individuals with disabilities if that accommodation would allow the
employee to enjoy the privileges or benefits offered by the employer. EEOC
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) (unpaginated),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html. Thus, if an employer hosts
a holiday party for its employees, and one of the employees uses a wheelchair, the
employer should make sure that the location of the party is accessible for the employee
who uses a wheelchair.
190
Porter, supra note 1, at 1136.
191
Id.
192
Id.
189
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hopefully, this proposal succeeds where the last one failed). Although
defining “needs” is still difficult, this proposal covers accommodations
beyond those that are strictly necessary in order to allow the employee
to perform the functions of the position. This is because I believe that
if an accommodation mandate only covered accommodations needed
by an employee in order to perform his job, there would be many
accommodations that would not be granted. A large subset of those
would be accommodations requested by caregivers because many
caregiving accommodations, such as reduced or modified hours, or
time off for various child-related activities, would not be seen as strictly
necessary in order to perform the functions of the job. Furthermore,
if a universal accommodation mandate covered only necessary
accommodations, the stigma suffered by those groups of employees
who are accommodated would continue.
At the same time, I do not suggest a universal accommodation
mandate should accommodate all requests equally. The pushback
from employers for such a proposal would be substantial. Moreover,
many of those who advocate on behalf of individuals with disabilities
or caregivers might be worried about the dilution effect193—that giving
someone running a marathon the same right to an accommodation as
someone who has a caregiving conflict or needs flextime to
accommodate medical appointments for a disability will dilute the
effectiveness of the rights given to protected groups.
As a compromise between these two competing views, I propose a
universal accommodation mandate with a two-tier undue hardship
analysis. This two-tier undue hardship analysis would work as follows.
For all accommodations that are necessary either because the
employee cannot perform the job without it (for any reason, not just
because of a disability) or because the employee would be neglecting
unavoidable caregiving obligations without it, this proposal would
apply the more stringent undue hardship standard borrowed from the
ADA—defined as “significant difficulty or expense.”194 For all other
accommodations requested, the undue hardship standard that would
apply would be the more relaxed standard borrowed from the religious
accommodation context, where anything more than a de minimis
expense would constitute an undue hardship.195 Below I discuss how
this proposal would apply to various accommodation requests.

193
194
195

I will discuss the dilution effect in more detail below. See infra Part IV.C.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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C. Application of the Universal Accommodation Mandate
This universal accommodation mandate would apply to both the
physical functions of the job and to the structural norms of the
workplace. And, as noted above, it would cover accommodations that
are not strictly “necessary.” This feature is one thing that makes this
proposal different from other universal accommodation proposals.
For instance, in Accommodating Every Body, four disability scholars
propose accommodating every “work-capable” individual for whom
the “provision of reasonable accommodation is necessary to give
meaningful access to enable their ability to work.”196 The authors
emphasize that not every desire for an accommodation, even when that
accommodation would be effective, would result in an entitlement.197
The proposed accommodation would have to be “necessary for an
individual to fulfill essential job functions.”198 My proposal is broader,
covering not just necessary accommodations but also everything else.
1. Necessary Accommodations
I classify “necessary accommodations” as encompassing two
things. First, an accommodation is necessary if an employee cannot
perform the essential functions of the job without it. Second, an
accommodation is necessary if the employee would be neglecting
unavoidable caregiving obligations without it.
a. Individuals with Disabilities
Many individuals with disabilities need accommodations in order
to perform the essential functions of their jobs. And because
individuals with disabilities are already entitled to an accommodation
under the ADA,199 the status quo would not change for most of them
under my proposal. But because employers cannot scrutinize the
reason for the accommodation, employees would not need to first
prove that they have a disability as defined under the ADA. Rather,
the employees would have to demonstrate to their employer only that
they have a physical limitation that makes it impossible for them to
perform the essential function of the job without an accommodation.
The one area where my proposal might differ from current law
under the ADA is with regards to accommodations that are not strictly
necessary in order to perform the functions of the job. This situation

196
197
198
199

Stein et al., supra note 20, at 693.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
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might arise if an employee requests an accommodation that allows the
employee to enjoy the privileges or benefits of a particular workplace.
As stated in an enforcement guidance by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),200 the ADA “requires employers to
provide reasonable accommodations so that employees with
disabilities can enjoy the ‘benefits and privileges of employment’ equal
to those enjoyed by similarly-situated employees without disabilities.”201
These might include services such as employee assistance programs;
credit unions, cafeterias, lounges, gymnasiums, and auditoriums;
transportation; and parties or other social functions.202 These benefits
and privileges of employment might not be “necessary” for an
employee to perform the essential functions of the job.
I am conflicted about how to deal with this. Under my proposal,
these accommodation requests would be subject to the less stringent
“undue hardship” standard because they would not be strictly
necessary. And yet these accommodation requests are important for
the full integration of individuals with disabilities into the workplace.203
One factor that might mitigate the harm of this result is the fact that
some courts have denied such accommodations under the ADA using
a cost/benefit analysis. For instance, in Vande Zande v. Wisconsin
Department of Administration,204 the court held that the employer did not
have to provide a lowered sink in the break room so that the plaintiff,
who used a wheelchair, could reach the sink. The evidence provided
that lowering the sink would cost only $150, which would clearly not
be unduly expensive.205 However, the court stated:
Given the proximity of the bathroom sink, Vande Zande can
hardly complain that the inaccessibility of the kitchenette sink
interfered with her ability to work or with her physical comfort.
Her argument rather is that forcing her to use the bathroom
sink for activities (such as washing out her coffee cup) for
which the other employees could use the kitchenette sink
stigmatized her as different or inferior . . . . But we do not think
an employer has a duty to expend even modest amounts of
money to bring about an absolute identity in working
200

EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE
HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002)
(unpaginated), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html.
201
See id.
202
See id.
203
See Stein et al., supra note 20, at 744–49 (discussing the importance of
integration of individuals with disabilities).
204
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
205
Id. at 546.
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conditions between disabled and non-disabled workers. The
creation of such a duty would be the inevitable consequence of
deeming a failure to achieve identical conditions
“stigmatizing.” That is merely an epithet. We conclude that
access to a particular sink, when an access to an equivalent sink,
conveniently located, is provided, is not a legal duty of an
employer.206
Thus, even though the ADA currently requires employers to
accommodate privileges and benefits of employment (rather than only
those accommodations that are necessary for the employee to perform
the essential functions of the job), courts often find ways to deny those
accommodations.207 I say this not to excuse those decisions (because I
think these accommodations should be given) but to point out that my
proposal is unlikely to cause a significant departure from the current
state of affairs.
b. Older Workers
As discussed in the Accommodating Every Body article mentioned
above,208 as increasingly more individuals want or need to continue
working later in life, many will end up having impairments that affect
their ability to perform some of the functions of the job, especially if
the job is physically arduous.209 While many of these individuals might
also be considered individuals with disabilities—especially after the
expansion of the definition of disability in the ADA Amendments
Act210—some might have pain or limitations that do not rise to the level
of a disability.211 Furthermore, forcing older individuals to claim and
argue that they should be considered an individual with a disability will
lead to many of them choosing not to seek accommodations.212
My proposal will not require these older individuals to prove that
206

Id.
See, e.g., id.
208
See generally Stein et al., supra note 20.
209
Id. at 703, 708.
210
See generally Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 46–47 (pointing to the numerous
cases where courts adopted a much broader definition of disability under the ADA
after the ADA Amendments Act).
211
Furthermore, there is some doubt about the effectiveness of the ADA
Amendments Act in changing the judiciary’s opinion about the proper scope of
disability protections. Stein et al., supra note 20, at 699.
212
Id. at 708 (“Impaired individuals’ reluctance to request an accommodation may
be driven by questions regarding whether they have a legally defined ‘disability,’ the
desire to avoid the perception that they are getting ‘special’ treatment, an inhospitable
workplace culture, fears of retaliation, and/or the incentive to pursue SSDI benefits
instead of pursuing work.”).
207
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they belong to the class of individuals protected under the ADA.
Instead, as long as an accommodation is needed to allow the older
employee to perform the essential functions of the job, the
accommodation would have to be granted.
In addition to older workers who might have restrictions on their
ability to perform some workplace tasks, some workers who are smaller
than the average person might also have difficulty performing some
tasks and therefore might need an accommodation in order to be able
to perform the essential functions of the job.213 Of course, only if the
accommodation is reasonable and does not cause an undue hardship
does the accommodation have to be granted. An accommodation
would not be reasonable if it required the elimination of an essential
function of the job.214
c. Pregnancy
Although many pregnant women proceed through their entire
pregnancies without any difficulties, some women are put on certain
restrictions by their doctors because of actual or potential
complications with the pregnancy.215 For instance, some doctors might
place a pregnant woman on a lifting restriction, demanding that she
not lift more than a certain amount.216 In other cases, if the employee
has a physically arduous job, the doctor might ask that she be placed
on light duty.217
213

See id. at 697 (discussing the fact that many workplace environments and pieces
of equipment have been built around or structured with the average man in mind,
thereby excluding many women); Jessica L. Roberts, Accommodating the Female Body: A
Disability Paradigm of Sex Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1297, 1303–05 (2008)
(exploring cockpits, machinery, and other workplace characteristics that
unintentionally exclude many women and individuals with disabilities).
214
See, e.g., Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1217 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that
employers need not eliminate essential functions of the job to accommodate an
employee with a disability); D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1229
(11th Cir. 2005). Because the employer would be required to consider the
accommodation requested by a small woman, however, the employer might realize
that there are alternative ways to perform the particular function. See Stein et al., supra
note 20, at 697 n.31 (pointing to the example of women generally being unable to
perform the fireman’s lift to rescue people from a burning building, but noting there
are other modes of rescue that allow women to execute the same function in an
alternative manner).
215
See generally Bradley Areheart, Accommodating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125
(2016).
216
See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1344 (2015) (noting
that the plaintiff’s doctor “told her she should not lift more than twenty pounds during
the first twenty weeks of her pregnancy or more than ten pounds thereafter.”).
217
Tysinger v. Police Dep’t of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting
that the plaintiff’s doctor put her on light duty from her job as a police officer after
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Under my proposal, in cases where the doctor places the pregnant
woman on restrictions to protect the health of the woman or the
unborn baby, the accommodation is considered necessary and the
employer would have to provide it, absent being able to prove that the
accommodation is unreasonable or creates an undue hardship under
the more stringent standard—significant difficulty or expense.218
d. Unavoidable Caregiving Obligations
In addition to situations where individuals cannot perform the
physical functions of the job without an accommodation, I also believe
an accommodation is necessary if a caregiver would be neglecting
unavoidable caregiving obligations without it. Although delineating
the precise boundaries and parameters of these unavoidable
caregiving obligations is beyond the scope of this Article, I have a
rough idea of where that line should be drawn.
As I have discussed above and elsewhere,219 some of the most
troubling stories involve caregivers having to choose between their job
and caring for their minor children. For instance, one woman was
terminated because her child was in a car accident and had to be taken
to the hospital.220 Another mother left her children aged one and nine
alone because the babysitter had not arrived and the mother feared
termination if she did not report to work; while she was gone, the
children died in a fire.221 In another horrendous case, a caregiver left
a two-year-old child home alone to avoid losing her job and, in her
absence, the child fell from a balcony and died.222 Some parents force
older children to miss school to stay home and care for younger
children who are sick.223 Another caregiver lost her job because she
stayed home with her child who had the flu.224
Accordingly, one reform I proposed in earlier work was to protect
she was in an altercation with a suspect).
218
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2008).
219
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 407–09.
220
9TO5, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WORKING WOMEN, 10 Things That Could Happen
to You if You Didn’t Have Paid Sick Days And The Best Way to Make Sure They Never Happen
to
Anyone,
4
(2014),
http://njtimetocare.com/sites/default/files/18_Ten%20Things%20That%20Could
%20Happen%20to%20You%20if%20You%20Didnt%20Have%20Paid%20Sick%20D
ays.pdf.
221
Nina Bernstein, Daily Choice Turned Deadly: Children Left on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/19/nyregion/daily-choiceturned-deadly-children-left-on-their-own.html.
222
See id.
223
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 408.
224
See id.

PORTER (DO NOT DELETE)

116

11/3/2016 1:17 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:85

caregivers from termination in these situations.225 In other words, at a
bare minimum, caregivers who would be terminated if they are not
given an accommodation that is needed to keep them from neglecting
unavoidable caregiving obligations should be accommodated. Only if
the accommodation would cause an undue hardship using the more
stringent ADA standard—significant difficulty or expense—should the
accommodation be refused.
Thus, even though defining unavoidable caregiving obligations is
not easy, we should all be able to agree that employees should be
protected when they miss work because they have no responsible
person with whom to leave a child under the age of twelve, despite
having made reasonable efforts to find such a person.226 Such a
situation might arise because the child’s illness precluded attendance
at a group-based daycare or school, because a babysitter is too ill to
care for the child or otherwise does not show up for work, or because
the child’s school is unexpectedly closed.227 Certainly there are likely
to be disputes regarding what constitutes reasonable efforts to find
alternative care arrangements, as well as defining who is a responsible
person.228
One way to solve some of these disputes is to borrow from
Professor Peggie Smith, who has proposed using the standards from
unemployment compensation cases in order to define unavoidable
caregiving obligations. In her article, Accommodating Routine Parental
Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious
Accommodations,229 Professor Smith proposes a model for
accommodating parental obligations that focuses on “compelling
parental obligations.”230 Her proposal requires an employee seeking
accommodation to demonstrate that the employee (1) faced a
compelling parental obligation that conflicted with an employment
requirement; (2) informed the employer about the conflict; and (3)
was discharged or disciplined for failing to comply with the conflicting
employment requirement.231 If the employee could prove this, then
the employer would have the burden of proving that the employer
made a good faith effort to accommodate the employee’s parental

225

Id. at 407–09.
Id. at 409.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of WorkFamily Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (2001).
230
Id. at 1465–79.
231
Id. at 1466.
226
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obligations or that the employer was unable to reasonably
accommodate the employee without experiencing an undue
hardship.232 So Professor Smith’s proposal—similar to mine—requires
determining what is considered a “compelling parental obligation.”
To do so, Professor Smith relies on unemployment compensation
case law.233 As explained by Smith, employees who are terminated from
their jobs may be eligible for unemployment compensation, but they
are usually ineligible if they voluntarily quit their jobs or are fired for
misconduct.234 Courts often apply a “good cause” standard in assessing
whether an employee leaves a job voluntarily.235 Thus, courts are often
required to consider whether employees had good cause for
voluntarily leaving their employment based on work-family conflicts.236
Smith uses these decisions to help delineate the parameters of when
employees are faced with compelling parental obligations that require
accommodation.237
Some of the cases where the employee was able to prove that she
had good cause to voluntarily quit her employment or to refute an
employer’s argument that it terminated for misconduct include: when
an employer suddenly and dramatically changes an employee’s
schedule, making the employee’s prior daycare arrangement
unworkable (and the employee cannot find an affordable alternative
compatible with the new shift);238 changing an employee’s schedule
from a predictable shift to one that varies daily where the employee
had no alternative daycare on the days she was required to work until
8:30 p.m.;239 and where an employee was fired for missing two days of
work after her employer changed her shift to the evening shift and she
was unable to arrange alternative childcare.240 As explained by Smith,
these cases and others like them include two related inquiries: the
significance of the parental obligation at stake and the reasonableness
of the employee’s efforts to meet that obligation.241
Smith explains that courts are more likely to find that good cause
led an employee to quit her job when the employee’s family
232

Id.
Id. at 1467–72.
234
Id. at 1467.
235
Smith, supra note 229, at 1467.
236
Id. at 1468.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 1468 (citing White v. Sec. Link, 658 A.2d 619 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994)).
239
Id. at 1469 (citing Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990)).
240
Id. at 1469–70 (citing King v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 414 A.2d
452 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)).
241
Smith, supra note 229, at 1470.
233
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responsibility is deemed “compelling and necessitous.”242 This occurs
when there are “circumstances that . . . would compel a reasonable
person under those circumstances to act in the same manner.”243 Thus,
when an employee is forced to quit her job because she refuses to leave
her children unaccompanied at home in the evening, this would be
considered a compelling reason to separate from her job.244 Smith
recognizes (as do I) that not all caregiving obligations are compelling
(or unavoidable as I refer to them). For instance, she argues that an
employee’s desire to leave work early to attend a child’s softball game
is not compelling, nor is taking time off to accompany a child on a class
field trip.245 Both of these situations do not present circumstances that
would compel a reasonable person to separate from his or her job.246
As Smith summarizes: “The underlying premise of this proposal is that
some parental sacrifices are unacceptable: employees should not be
forced unnecessarily to choose between the fundamental welfare of
their children and employment.”247
I recognize that, even with the explanation above, “unavoidable
caregiving obligations” is still a vague term. But as Smith notes, using
the precedent from unemployment compensation cases can provide
guidance for determining when a caregiving obligation should be
deemed compelling or unavoidable. If we ask the same question as the
unemployment compensation courts ask—would a reasonable person
be compelled to quit if faced with a similar dilemma between caring
for children and work?—we should arrive at the correct answer.
2. All Other Accommodation Requests
All of the above “necessary” accommodations should be granted
as long as the accommodation does not cause an undue hardship for
the employer under the more stringent definition of “significant
difficulty or expense.” Under my proposal, all other accommodation
requests should still be granted unless the accommodation would
cause an undue hardship under the more lenient standard of anything
more than a de minimis expense.
This category would basically encompass everything else not
defined as a “necessary” accommodation above. Some reasons an
employee might seek a workplace accommodation include: advancing
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id. at 1471.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith, supra note 229, at 1471.
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her education; community volunteering or other civic engagement; a
second job or starting a business;248 and other intellectual, physical, or
emotional pursuits. These types of pursuits might lead an employee to
request a schedule change or reduced hours for a period of time.
Although not all jobs allow for an easy adjustment of working hours,
many employers have found that schedule changes, especially minor
adjustments to the starting and stopping time, are relatively simple to
provide.
The two more difficult or controversial categories that would fall
under the more lenient undue hardship standard (because they would
not be classified as “necessary”) are religious accommodation requests
and caregiving accommodation requests that are not for “unavoidable
caregiving obligations,” discussed above.
a. Religion
As noted above, Title VII requires employers to accommodate an
employee’s bona fide religious beliefs and practices if they conflict with
a workplace rule:
The term “religion” includes all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s
or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.249
Even though the statute uses the same “undue hardship” phrase as the
ADA, the Supreme Court has defined that phrase quite differently in
the religious accommodation context.250 The Court held in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison that an employer should not have to be
short-handed or pay others premium pay through overtime in order to
accommodate the plaintiff’s desire not to work on his Sabbath.251
According to the Court, requiring “TWA to bear more than a de
minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off [was] an undue
hardship.”252 The Court believed that requiring TWA to bear
additional costs when no such costs are incurred to give other
employees a day off would involve “unequal treatment of employees

248

Obviously, an employer would be allowed to enforce normal non-compete
agreements.
249
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1991).
250
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 64 (1977).
251
Id. at 84.
252
Id.
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on the basis of their religion.”253 Absent legislative history to the
contrary, the Court could not “readily construe the statute to require
an employer to discriminate against some employees in order to
enable others to observe their Sabbath.”254
Two things likely account for the difference between how the
religious accommodation provision is treated as compared to the
ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision. First, because the ADA
protects only individuals with disabilities, it does not allow for “reverse
discrimination” claims.255 The religious accommodation provision, on
the other hand, is part of Title VII, which protects all employees based
on their religion (in addition to race, color, sex, and national origin).256
And second, there is some evidence that the Court narrowly defined
employers’ obligations to accommodate religious practices to avoid a
conflict with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.257
Although there have been proposals to expand the reasonable
accommodation obligation for religion,258 thus far, neither the
Supreme Court nor Congress has broadened the coverage of the
religious accommodation provision. Although I would not be opposed
to broadened coverage for religious accommodations—that is,
requiring employers to accommodate employees’ religious practices as
long as those accommodations do not result in “significant difficulty or
expense”—my proposal maintains the status quo with respect to
religious accommodations.
b. Avoidable Caregiving Obligations
As discussed above, I recognize that distinguishing between
avoidable and unavoidable caregiving obligations is difficult. Yet, I
believe we need to make a real effort to do so, for reasons that I
describe more fully below. Obviously, the question that would be
asked in these cases is whether the caregiving obligation is unavoidable,
not avoidable. But just to give the reader an idea of what types of
caregiving tasks or obligations I think are avoidable, here is a brief (and
253

Id.
Id. at 85.
255
Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 7.
256
Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 81 (“The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of
both the language and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating
discrimination in employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is
directed against majorities as well as minorities.”).
257
Leach C. Myers, Disability Harassment: How Far Should the ADA Follow in the
Footsteps of Title VII?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 265, 268–69 (2003).
258
See, e.g., Nantiya Ruan, Accommodating Respectful Religious Expression in the
Workplace, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
254
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incomplete) list.
If a caregiver asked for reduced hours (or modified hours) so she
could be home every day at 3:00 p.m. when her kids get home from
school—assuming that her children do not have special needs or she
does not live in an area where after-school care is unavailable—this
would be an avoidable caregiving obligation. Similarly, if a caregiver
asked for reduced hours or a compressed workweek so she could have
one or two days off every week to spend with her baby or toddler, this
would be an avoidable caregiving obligation. Absences that exceeded
an employer’s attendance policy that were requested to allow a parent
to attend a child’s game or performance or to volunteer at the child’s
school or on a school field trip would be an avoidable caregiving task.
To be clear, I think employers should consider all of these
requested accommodations and grant them when possible. Under this
proposal, employees would have a right to request these
accommodations and the employer could refuse them only if they
resulted in an undue hardship as defined under the more lenient
standard of anything more than de minimis expense.
However, many of these requests would not cost an employer any
money or result in any loss of productivity. For instance, a request for
modified hours (but not a reduction in total hours) is often a very easy
accommodation to grant, assuming the individual’s job can be
performed at any time.259 And an extra absence or two because an
employee wants to attend a school performance or volunteer at a
school field trip or party is unlikely to cause any hardship on the
employer. Either the employee is paid hourly and is therefore not paid
for that missed time or the employee is salaried and will likely make
the time up later in the day or week.
My point is not to say that all accommodations will have to be
granted. Rather, my point is simply that, once employers are required
to consider these types of requests, they might realize how easy it is for
them to grant many or most of them.

259

In fact, “flex time” or flexible working hours is the most frequently provided
accommodation given to caregivers. See Ellen Galinsky et al., 2008 National Study of
Employers,
FAMILIES
AND
WORK
INST.
6
(2008),
http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/2008nse.pdf (stating that 79% of
employers now allow at least some employees to periodically change their arrival and
departure time).
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D. Justifying this Universal Accommodation Mandate
1. Partially Remedying the Caregiver Conundrum
There are several benefits of this proposal, and I imagine different
readers will be motivated by different reasons. Based on my interests,
one of the primary justifications for this proposal is to provide
assistance to caregivers trying to balance work and family. As I have
discussed in depth elsewhere, caregivers have very few rights to a
flexible workplace—that is, one that allows them to balance work and
family.260 Other than limited leave under the FMLA, and the right to
be free from discrimination based on pregnancy, caregivers are not
entitled to any accommodations to allow them to balance work and
family.261 Thus, caregivers are often at the whim of the strict attendance
policies of some employers, and many caregivers have no ability to
control their schedules or the number of hours they work.262
This proposal would allow these employees to request modified
schedules or to miss work if needed to care for a sick child or take a
child to the doctor. Even though not all caregiving responsibilities
would be considered unavoidable and thus subject to the more
stringent undue hardship test, employees could seek an
accommodation for all caregiving obligations. If the employer refuses
the request, the employer would be required to prove that the
accommodation results in more than a de minimis expense. The hope
is that employers would begin to realize that many of these
accommodations are inexpensive or even costless.
As I have discussed before, communitarian theory helps us
understand that helping caregivers successfully balance work and
family benefits everyone.263 This is true for several reasons. First, at a
very basic level, we all benefit from parents’ choices to procreate
because society needs procreation to continue and employers need
procreation to continue to staff their workplaces.264 Professor Fineman
frequently refers to caretaking work as an “important and essential
public good. Every society and every institution in society is dependent
260

See, e.g., Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 370–80; Porter, Stigma, supra note 26,
at 235–36.
261
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 361–63.
262
Id. at 363–65.
263
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 396–98. The remainder of this subpart is
derived in significant part from Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 395–403. However,
to avoid excessive citations to my prior work, I will cite to the original sources cited in
that piece.
264
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1137–38 (1986).
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upon caretaking labor in order to perpetuate and reproduce itself.”265
Second, everyone lives with the consequences of children who are not
brought up well and who then harm communities through misconduct
and crime.266
Third, even non-caregivers should support
accommodations provided for caregiving because non-caregivers
could find themselves engaging in caregiving involuntarily. Even if
they do not have children, many workers have spouses/partners and
parents, and many of these adult loved ones could become disabled
and dependent as they age.267 And there are benefits to having
dependent adults cared for by loved ones. Not only do adults have
better health and happiness outcomes when cared for by loved ones,268
but also, society needs the thirty-three million unpaid family caregivers
to continue giving that care—the long-term care system would collapse
and nursing homes would burst at the seams without the unpaid work
of family caregivers.269 Finally, we all benefit from allowing caregivers
to balance work and family because this means that as we age or
become disabled and need care, we will reap the benefits of having
institutional structures in place that will allow our loved ones to care
for us without sacrificing their jobs.270
2. Avoiding the Difficulty and Stigma of Classification
Another benefit of this proposal is that accommodating everyone
mostly avoids the stigma of classification. In order to be protected
under current law, an employee has to fall into a particular protected
class. Primarily, this includes individuals with disabilities, but it also
might include those who need accommodations for religious practices
or, after the decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,271 pregnant
workers. Although it is not difficult to establish that you belong to a
particular religion or that you are pregnant, it is more difficult to
establish that you have a disability, even after the Amendments have

265

Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1406
(2001).
266
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 54, 69 (1993).
267
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 399.
268
K. Nicole Harms, Caring for Mom & Dad: The Importance of Family-Provided
Eldercare and the Positive Implications of California’s Paid Family Leave Law, 10 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 69, 83–85 (2003).
269
Jane Gross, Who Cares for the Caregivers?, N.Y. TIMES: NEW OLD AGE (Oct. 14,
2008),
http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/who-cares-for-thecaregivers/.
270
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 400.
271
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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made it much easier to do so.272
Under my proposal, an individual would need a doctor’s note to
verify that there is some function of the job that the employee cannot
do or that the employee needs an accommodation for the employer’s
workplace structural norms (schedules, shifts, hours, etc.) because of
a mental or physical condition. But the employee would not be
required to prove to the employer that the condition qualifies as a
disability. Not only is this an easier burden to meet for the employee,
but it also avoids the stigma of being classified as “disabled.”273
Professor Albiston has also discussed the stigma that attaches from
having to be classified in a protected group in order to receive
accommodations. She states, “[f]ocusing on how work must change to
accommodate disability and gender marks women and people with
disabilities as separate and different from all workers, who become
normalized in the process.”274 Accommodating everyone avoids the
stigma of group classification.
3. Encouraging Changes to Workplace Structures
Although this proposal calls for an individual accommodation
mandate, the hope is that it ultimately encourages employers to see the
benefits of making broader structural changes to their workplaces.275
For instance, if several employees in one workplace seek an
accommodation of flextime hours, the employer might realize that
allowing flextime is not only relatively simple, but also that it would be
more efficient for the employer to set up a system whereby all
employees can work flextime rather than making individual
modifications for those employees who seek an accommodation.276
Similarly, several requests for a modification of the physical functions
of the job—perhaps for employees with lifting restrictions because of
a back impairment, pregnancy, or small stature—might cause the
employer to realize that there is a better way of performing that lifting

272

See generally Porter, Backlash, supra note 13.
See also Stein et al., supra note 20, at 752–53 (“Detaching the right to
accommodation from assignment of a special disability identity is consistent with
integrating employees with disabilities rather than marking, and perhaps stigmatizing,
them as essentially different from most workers.”).
274
ALBISTON, supra note 60, at 148.
275
See, e.g., Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 259 (arguing that accommodating more
employees could lead to employers restructuring the workplace).
276
See also Stein et al., supra note 20, at 751 (stating that their “accommodating
every body” proposal should lead “employers who value efficiency and innovation to
prophylactically implement changes in policy so as to make the workplace more
accessible for everyone”).
273
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function.277 This will not only help employees who have lifting
restrictions but also might cause fewer employees to get injured on the
job, reducing the employers’ workers compensation costs.
In some ways, this proposal is similar to proposals in favor of
“universal design,” which is an architectural principle in which
environments are designed to be useable by everyone to the maximum
extent possible.278 As noted by Stein and his co-authors, if “employers
anticipate having to make more accommodation-related changes to
the workplace environment, they may be more apt to invest time and
effort on the earlier ‘design’ end to avoid subsequent needs to
retrofit.”279 Professor Albiston also argues in favor of these types of
structural changes. She argues that the question should be focused
not on who needs changes to the workplace structure, but rather, on
whether the workplace could be restructured.280 She states, “[t]his
approach queries whether a work practice is necessary or desirable,
and does not simply assume it is necessary because it is part of the way
things have always been done.”281
4. Providing Economic Benefits
This proposal provides economic benefits not just to the
employees who receive the accommodations, but also to employers
and society. Most obviously, the employees who are accommodated
are benefitted by experiencing “higher levels of job satisfaction,”
“stronger intentions to remain with their employers,” less negative
spillover between work and home, and better mental health.282 This is
especially true in cases where not accommodating them might lead to
their termination (if they cannot perform the job without the
accommodation) or their resignation (if they cannot get an
accommodation that allows them to meet their caregiving obligations).
Accommodating employees allows them to avoid the devastating

277

See id. (“Employers and employees would join together efficiently to adjust
features of the job to help capable persons work, keep working, or otherwise optimize
workplace productivity—all of these outcomes being results that avail management
and worker alike.”).
278
Stein et al., supra note 20, at 751; Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the
Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 560 (2008) (stating that universal
design principles could guide the planning of a facility’s infrastructure and “[b]y
accommodating a greater number of ways of functioning at the construction stage,
fewer buildings would need to be retrofitted as access issues arise”).
279
Stein et al., supra note 20, at 751.
280
ALBISTON, supra note 60, at 107.
281
Id.
282
Galinsky et al., supra note 259, at 3.
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consequences of unemployment.283
But it is not just the accommodated employees and their families
who benefit from accommodations. Employers also benefit by keeping
valuable employees. The perceived costs of accommodation are often
greatly over-estimated,284 and the actual costs of attrition are quite
high.285 By providing reasonable accommodations that do not result in
an undue financial burden, employers would keep valuable employees
who would be more productive because of the accommodation. At the
same time, employers would avoid the high costs of attrition.286
Moreover, studies indicate that employees who are accommodated are
happier, more productive, and more loyal.287
Society also benefits when workers are accommodated. Especially
with respect to workers with disabilities, accommodating them
increases the likelihood that they will remain employed and will thus
not need to rely on public benefits.288
5. Providing Balance to Everyone
There has been renewed interest recently in the idea that
everyone needs balance in their lives—not just caregivers or those
employees who are dealing with a medical condition. Professor Trina
Jones, in Single and Childfree! Reassessing Parental and Marital Status
Discrimination, argues that providing family-friendly benefits only to
parents involves “implicit assumptions about the personal activities of
[childfree workers] and risk[s] perpetuating the notion that the
283

Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
47 GA. L. REV. 527, 581 (2013); Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the
Conflict Between Disabled Employees and Their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 336–37
(2007) [hereinafter Porter, Reasonable Burdens] (discussing the negative consequences
of termination).
284
Schur et al., supra note 18, at 609 (stating that most accommodations have no
or very low costs); Porter, supra note 1, at 1111 n.61 (citing sources demonstrating that
the costs of accommodation are greatly over-estimated).
285
Porter, supra note 1, at 1142; Schur et al., supra note 18, at 614.
286
Porter, Why Care, supra note 4, at 381 n.194; Galinsky et al., supra note 259, at 3
(stating that employers benefit from providing family-friendly workplaces because they
have “more engaged employees, higher retention and potentially lower health care
costs”).
287
Schur et al., supra note 18, at 607 (stating that individuals whose
accommodation requests were granted had better attitudes on important workplace
measures); id. at 612–13 (stating that a majority of employees in the study who had
received accommodations said the accommodations had a variety of positive impacts,
including more loyalty to the company; increased employee morale and job
satisfaction).
288
Stein et al., supra note 20, at 754 (stating that “empirical data show that receiving
a workplace accommodation reduces the likelihood that someone will apply for SSDI
benefits”).
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people and activities in a [childfree worker’s] life are not as important
as the people and activities in the lives of married couples or
parents.”289 Jones counters the point about the societal value of caring
for children by pointing to other scenarios that also have social value,
such as when a childfree employee assists a sibling who has lost a job
or an employee elects to support a community center in a low-income
neighborhood.290 She states, “[t]he point is that employees engage in
many socially valuable activities outside of the workplace. Merely
asserting that parenting should be subsidized because it may produce
positive consequences does not explain why parenting should be
elevated above these other socially valuable activities.”291 Some of the
other important activities that childfree employees might engage in
include: “furthering one’s education, volunteering with a homeless
shelter, or working with other community organizations.”292 She also
points out that childfree workers engage in other kinds of caregiving,
such as “caring for friends, siblings, neighbors, and other people’s
children.”293 And yet, under the current law, caregiving is defined
narrowly; for instance, the FMLA only allows leave to care for a spouse,
parent, or child, ignoring the significance of other close
relationships.294
The point made by Jones is an important one. Single, childfree
workers might not want to spend every minute working.295 They might
want to enjoy a healthy balance between work and the rest of their lives.
Thus, she argues that employers should adopt policies that all
employees can use.296 Rather than thinking only in terms of “familyfriendly” policies, “employers would aim to design workplaces that
produce greater work-life balance for all workers.”297 As she poignantly
points out: “[f]riends care for friends. Neighbors look out for each
other. . . . [a]nd, family love is not solely directed at spouses, parents,
and children, but includes aunts, uncles, siblings, and cousins.”298
289

Jones, supra note 166, at 1301.
Id. at 1304.
291
Id.
292
Id. at 1308.
293
Id.
294
Id. at 1272.
295
Jones, supra note 166, at 1314.
296
Id. at 1330.
297
Id. at 1330–31; see also Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a Reduced
Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW ECONOMY: THE
CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 135 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owens eds., 2006)
(arguing in favor of reduced hours for all employees to ensure sufficient time for
“family, community, and leisure”).
298
Jones, supra note 166, at 1342.
290
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6. Avoiding Special Treatment Stigma
Last, but certainly not least, this proposal can make significant
steps in minimizing and hopefully299 eliminating special treatment
stigma.
Quite simply, if all employees were entitled to
accommodations, there would no longer be any special treatment;
thus, there would no longer be “special treatment stigma.”300
This rationale was also relied on in the Accommodating Every Body
article, discussed above. As the authors of that article note,
normalizing accommodations by making them available to everyone
will remove the perception that accommodations are stigmatizing.301
Furthermore, in a study of the reactions of employees and employers
regarding accommodations in the workplace, the authors conclude
that reform should be aimed at accommodating all employees.302
Specifically, they argue that accommodations “need to be viewed in the
context of accommodations for the personal needs of all employees,
and that accommodations may not only maximize the inclusion of
people with disabilities but may have positive spillovers on other
employees that foster overall workplace productivity.”303 They also
point out that some companies are already trying to accommodate all
employees, specifically mentioning those who have work/life balance
issues.304 In the caregiving context, several scholars have argued that
providing workplace flexibility benefits to all employees will eliminate
the stigma of only providing family-friendly benefits to caregivers.305 In
sum, because providing accommodations only to some employees is so
stigmatizing, eliminating that stigma through a universal
accommodation mandate is the primary goal of and justification for
this proposal.

299

I use the word “hopefully” because, as I will discuss infra Part IV.A, it is possible
that some stigma would remain even if this proposal were adopted.
300
Porter, supra note 1, at 1133–36; Porter, Stigma, supra note 26, at 258–59
(discussing the benefits of accommodating everyone).
301
Stein et al., supra note 20, at 750, 755.
302
Schur et al., supra note 18, at 614–16.
303
Id. at 616.
304
Id. at 605, 614.
305
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 166, at 1331; Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 297, at
140 (stating that adopting a universal approach of a reduced workweek for everyone
would free caregivers of the stigma associated with more targeted benefits); Mary Anne
Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and How the
Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 1753, 1768 (2001)
(stating that by accommodating all employees’ hobbies and personal pursuits, we will
reduce the stigma of providing workplace benefits to only some).
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IV. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS
I recognize that this proposal will be seen by some as fairly radical.
Thus, in this Part, I have attempted to anticipate and respond to the
primary criticisms that will be lobbed at me and this proposal.
A. Remnants of Special Treatment Stigma
Despite my statement above that the primary benefit of this
proposal is eliminating special treatment stigma, I recognize that the
possibility of some residual stigma remains. This is for two reasons.
First, even though everyone has a right to request and receive
accommodations under this proposal, certain employees are slightly306
more likely to receive those accommodations because of the two-tier
undue hardship approach. Those who need accommodations because
they would not be able to perform their jobs without them and those
who would be neglecting unavoidable caregiving obligations without
an accommodation are entitled to the benefit of the more stringent
undue hardship test—significant difficulty or expense.307 Although the
first group is broader than only individuals who have a disability—it
includes everyone who has a physical or mental condition that requires
accommodation in order for her to be able to perform her job308—it is
possible that this group will be perceived as comprising only or mainly
individuals with disabilities. The second group (the unavoidable
caregiving obligations group) might be viewed as preferring some life
choices (having children) over other life choices.
I have three responses to this criticism. First, those who express
resentment about including unavoidable caregiving obligations should
be reminded that not all caregivers are accommodated. In fact, it is
relatively difficult for an employee to prove that a caregiving obligation
is unavoidable.309 Many caregiving requests will fall under the catch-all
“All Other Accommodation Requests” category. Second, caregiving is
defined broadly to include not just caring for children but also caring
for adult loved ones who are disabled or ill: spouses or partners,
306

I use the word “slightly” because I think the difference between the two levels
of undue hardship will not be dispositive all that often. This is because some
accommodations will be deemed unreasonable before we even get to the undue
hardship defense (imagine a request by a hotel housekeeper to be allowed to work
from home) and because so many accommodations are costless (such as flex-time);
thus, an employer would not be able to prove undue hardship even under the more
lenient test.
307
See supra Part III.B.
308
Thus, as stated above, pregnant women or older employees would be included
in this group. See supra Part III.C.1.
309
See supra Part III.C.1.d.
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parents, siblings, and other relatives. Thus, even though someone has
made a decision to remain child free, that person might inadvertently
be thrust into a caregiving role because of the need to care for an adult
loved one. Third (and perhaps most importantly), those who need an
accommodation to be able to perform their jobs (even if they are not
disabled under the ADA) and those who would be neglecting
unavoidable caregiving obligations without the accommodation need
those accommodations to be able to keep their jobs. Because of the
devastating consequences of unemployment (especially for those
employees who might have difficulty finding another job, such as
individuals with disabilities, pregnant workers, and older employees),
these “necessary” accommodations deserve slightly more protection
than everything else.
The second reason some stigma might remain despite my effort
to eliminate it is because it is possible that, even though everyone has
the right to seek accommodations under this proposal, only those who
have traditionally sought accommodations will seek the benefit of this
proposal. In other words, because mostly women seek workplace
modifications to manage work/life balance,310 if women and
individuals with disabilities311 continue to request the vast majority of
accommodations under this regime, it is likely that there will remain
some special treatment stigma. I do not have a great response to this
criticism except to say that this proposal’s effectiveness will depend on
employers and employees fully embracing it. Perhaps accompanying
this proposal with a strong public relations campaign emphasizing the
benefits of accommodating everyone will help to ensure that everyone
believes that they can and should make use of their ability to balance
work and life goals under a universal accommodation mandate.312
B. Employer Discretion
Although there is some argument that a universal
accommodation mandate can actually be beneficial because it
eliminates the tough decisions supervisors and managers must make
regarding who deserves accommodations and for what reasons when
those accommodations are not required by law,313 employers might

310

Porter, supra note 1, at 1104 n.14.
Of course, I do not mean these to be mutually exclusive groups. I recognize
that there are many women who have disabilities, and many of them are also caregivers.
312
It should go without saying that this proposal would need to be accompanied
by an anti-retaliation provision that makes it unlawful to retaliate against an employee
who has sought his right to an accommodation under this proposal.
313
Porter, Reasonable Burdens, supra note 283, at 344–46.
311
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object to it for exactly this reason. In other words, some employers
might prefer to have complete discretion in determining when to wield
their power of granting preferential treatment. Of course, this
discretion can be used in illegitimate ways,314 and thus, this is a good
reason to limit it.
On the other side of the spectrum, this proposal might also be
criticized because it gives too much discretion to employers, in that it
requires them to make decisions about accommodating a much larger
group of employees for a much broader set of reasons.315 The labor
movement is generally suspicious of giving employers the discretion to
decide who gets accommodations or modifications of neutral
workplace rules.316 However, in non-unionized workplaces not bound
by collective bargaining agreements,317 employers already have this
discretion and many employers have likely exercised this discretion
based on arbitrary or discriminatory reasons.
For instance, two employees might ask for the same type of
accommodation—a change in their schedules to better accommodate
their caregiving obligations. The employer might grant the request for
one employee and not the other, perhaps based on the employer’s
perceptions of how valuable and productive the favored employee is
(and therefore worth keeping happy) or perhaps based on something
less legitimate, such as old-fashioned favoritism or discrimination. The
employee who is granted the accommodation is told to keep it quiet
and the employee who is denied the accommodation is likely told that
only individuals with disabilities are allowed modifications to their
314

Matthew A. Shapiro, Labor Goals and Antidiscrimination Norms: Employer Discretion,
Reasonable Accommodation, and the Costs of Individualized Treatment, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 4–5 (2013) (stating that employer discretion is “a force prone to abuse” because
employers might use their discretion in illegitimate ways).
315
See id. at 53, which argues against universal accommodation mandates,
specifically because they increase the amount of discretion an employer has and can
be used to harm the goal of organized labor. More specifically, Shapiro argues that
the discretion in providing accommodations could be used to harm those who support
the union. Id. at 32.
316
Id. at 33 (“While this increased flexibility promises significant benefits for
nondisabled employees, it entails what the labor movement would regard as a
significant cost: undermining a generally applicable workplace policy designed to
constrain the discretion of employers and thus their ability to engage in arbitrary
treatment.”).
317
I recognize that there are some unique concerns with unionized workplaces,
especially with regard to how this proposal would interact with collective bargaining
agreements. However, because only around seven percent of private sector employees
are unionized, see, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Women, Unions, and Negotiation, 14
NEV. L.J. 465 n.1 (2014), the intricacies of how this proposal might play out in the
context of unionized workplaces with collective bargaining agreements is beyond the
scope of this Article.
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schedules. Under my proposal, the employer would have to consider
both accommodation requests and could deny them only if they
resulted in an undue hardship.
I do not dispute that this proposal still leaves employers with
discretion—in determining whether the accommodation falls into the
“necessary” category (which determines the level of undue hardship to
apply) and in determining whether the accommodation would cause
an undue hardship.318 Obviously, adjusting to new employer mandates
is never easy or painless, but just as employers have become
accustomed to the requirements of the ADA and the FMLA, they would
also become accustomed to this proposal. And if it appears that
employers are applying the requirements of this proposal in a
discriminatory fashion319 (for instance, based on sex or race), those
employees could and should complain (internally or externally) about
this discrimination.
C. Dilution
Some scholars are opposed to universal solutions because they
threaten to dilute the rights of disadvantaged groups by trivializing the
more serious harms of discrimination and undermining support for
anti-discrimination in general.320 Professor Jessica Clarke argues that
allowing protections for everyone trivializes the needs of caregivers and
individuals with disabilities and “water[s] down protections like
parental leave.”321 According to Professor Clarke, a truly universal
accommodation mandate that would allow for granting
accommodations for “frivolous” things like “manicures, fantasy
football, and tropical vacations” would “undermine the entire

318

Cf. Shapiro, supra note 314, at 32 (pointing out that, even in the disability
context, employers still have discretion in granting accommodations because
questions about who has a disability and whether a particular accommodation is
necessary to allow the employee to perform the essential functions of the job do not
have clear-cut answers).
319
Jessica Clarke has expressed concern about this problem. She argues that when
managers decide whether to offer work-family accommodations to some employees,
this inevitably involves those managers making judgment calls regarding “whose ‘life’
is more worthy of accommodation,” which might allow the “enforcement of class, race,
and gender biases.” Jessica Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in
Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1223 (2011).
320
Clarke, supra note 319, at 1247; see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 401, 479–80 (2000) (expressing
disagreement that the ADA should lead to a “universal regime of individualized
accommodation” because he favors protection only for those whose impairments are
“stigmatizing”).
321
Clarke, supra note 319, at 1278.
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project.”322 She notes that when scholars argue in favor of universal
mandates, they give examples like military service or volunteering
because these look like caregiving in that they contribute to the
“reproduction and preservation of American life and culture.”323 But a
truly universal accommodation mandate, Professor Clarke recognizes,
would also protect the worker who just wants to spend more time
watching television.324 This, in turn, might dilute the protections of
those who need them the most;
[i]f all employees were entitled to request leave for any reason,
and employers were not . . . permitted to inquire into a
worker’s reasons for taking leave, then a worker who needed
the day off to take an elderly parent to a doctor’s appointment
would have the same chance of getting that accommodation as
a worker who wants the day off to go fishing.325
This is a legitimate concern regarding my proposal. I have several
responses. First, using her example, it is quite possible that both
accommodations could be granted without any hardship at all on the
employer. As it stands now, many employers offer several days of
unexcused absences and even allow for the amorphous “personal
day.”326 Thus, for many employers, saying yes to both the caregiving
request and the fishing request would not change the status quo.
Second, if the caregiving request was because of an “unavoidable
caregiving obligation,” then the caregiving request would be given
preference because it would be subject to the more stringent undue
hardship test. Third, in the unlikely scenario that an employer
received both requests on the same day and concluded that it could
only grant one without causing an undue hardship, I imagine the
employer would naturally favor the caregiving employee.
But I recognize that there might be situations where an employer
is granting accommodations for reasons that most of us might think
are unworthy of protection. I personally would be bothered by
someone who seeks a modification of normal workplace hours to watch
television. But there are all kinds of accommodation requests that
would help an employee better balance their work life and home life
that have nothing to do with caregiving or a medical condition, and
yet are worthwhile to that employee’s personal well-being. Whether
that involves volunteering, community service, entrepreneurial efforts,
322
323
324
325
326

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1278–79.
Id. at 1279.
Porter, FMLA, supra note 44, at 361.
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continuing one’s education, or achieving some physical fitness goal
like running a marathon, all of these allow an employee to be renewed
and refreshed, which will make that employee more productive as well
as happier and more loyal. I am admittedly bothered by some of the
more frivolous reasons for seeking an accommodation, and there is
part of me that wants to find a way to preclude some of those
accommodation requests. But if we start prioritizing some reasons over
others, we are right back to where we started, with the stigma that
accompanies special treatment. In other words, the only way to
eliminate special treatment stigma is to accommodate everyone, for all
reasons (subject, of course, to the accommodation not causing an
undue hardship).
D. Cumulative Effects of Undue Hardship
Related to the dilution issue is the concern that those who need
the protections the most might not get an accommodation because of
the cumulative effects of undue hardship. For example, imagine that
five employees in the same department327 seek to work flextime,
whereby they want to come in at 7 a.m. and leave at 3 p.m. Three of
these employees are seeking this schedule to allow them to be home
after school with their children (this would most likely not be
considered an unavoidable caregiving obligation). One employee
wants the schedule because he is training for a marathon and this
schedule would allow him to train in the afternoons throughout the
fall and winter before it gets dark. Another employee has kidney
failure and needs this work schedule to accommodate his kidney
dialysis treatments. Let us further imagine that the first four
employees request and are granted this accommodation before the
fifth employee requests the accommodation. When the fifth employee
(the individual with a disability) requests the accommodation, the
employer legitimately believes that it cannot manage effectively with
five employees not working from 3:00-5:00 p.m. In other words, viewed
cumulatively, the fifth employee’s request would cause an undue
hardship for this employer, even using the more stringent undue
hardship test (significant difficulty or expense). Simply by virtue of
timing, and the cumulative effects of undue hardship, the employee
with the most significant need for the accommodation might have his
accommodation request rejected.
There are several ways to respond to this problem. One response
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particular employer would be relatively small.
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might be to recognize a “first in time” rule, and allow the first four
accommodation seekers to keep their accommodations and explain to
the fifth individual that he is out of luck because he did not request his
accommodation sooner. This strikes me as a very perverse result for
the reasons discussed above in the section on dilution.328 Some
accommodation requests are truly more compelling than others—
recognition of that fact is the reason for the two-tier undue hardship.
Another solution to this problem is to make the grant of
accommodations to the first four employees conditional,329 where they
are told that they can enjoy the accommodation as long as someone
with superior rights does not seek the same accommodation. This
would only happen in the admittedly rare case where several
employees requested the same accommodation and the employer
experienced an undue hardship because of the cumulative effect of
the multiple requests. For instance, in this case, the employer might
argue that because the fifth employee has a morally superior need for
the accommodation, one of the other employees who received the
accommodation has to relinquish it so that the employee with the
disability can get the schedule he needs to continue working with his
disability.
I recognize that this approach might exacerbate the special
treatment stigma that I am trying so hard to eliminate. My response is
to revert to my reliance on the ideals espoused by communitarian
theory. Communitarian theory places less emphasis on individual
rights and more of an emphasis on working together with others in our
community to support common goals.330 If we viewed the “workplace
as a community and understood ourselves as having a responsibility to
others in our community,” some of the resentment coworkers feel
could be dissipated.331 For instance, if the marathon-running employee
understood that the employee with kidney failure would not be able to
continue working without an accommodation, the marathon runner
should be willing to relinquish his right to the flextime in favor of the
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See supra Part IV.C.
This idea has a corollary in the area of riparian rights to a body of water. Under
common law riparianism, owners of land adjacent to a river or lake have the right to
withdraw a reasonable amount of the water, subject to the correlative rights of other
riparians to also make reasonable water withdrawals. Thus, no riparian has a right to
withdraw a fixed amount of water in perpetuity; it all depends on a variety of factors,
including the relative value of the various uses of the water. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Hat-tip to Professor Kenneth Kilbert
for giving me this example.
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employee with a disability.
Finally, it is not entirely clear whether cumulative effects should
be considered when determining undue hardship.332 This is an
undeveloped and unclear area in disability law; thus, settling on a
definitive answer here is premature. Thus, whether the cumulative
effect of accommodations should be considered in the ADA context
and in the context of my universal accommodation mandate is a
subject left for further study.
V. CONCLUSION
Accommodating only certain groups of employees has led to the
situation where accommodations are viewed with skepticism and often
resentment by both employers and the coworkers of those who receive
accommodations. This Article argues that this special treatment
stigma can only be eliminated by accommodating everyone. However,
unlike other proposals that argue in favor of accommodating only
those employees who need the accommodation to be able to perform
their jobs, or those scholars who propose accommodating everyone
indiscriminately, this proposal argues that we can accommodate
everyone while still recognizing that some requests for accommodation
are more compelling than others—hence, the two-tier undue hardship
test. I realize that many of the details of this proposal are left
unspecified. It was not my goal to write a statute. Instead, my hope is
to start a conversation about accommodating everyone.
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